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The Role of Long-term Loans for Economic Development: 
Empirical Evidence in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan* 
ç
By 
Shin-ichi Fukuda (The University of Tokyo) ** 
 




The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether long-term funds had a positive impact on 
investment in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.    When there exists a possibility of a liquidity shortage, the 
firm’s investment decision tends to be conservative.  Thus, to the extent that the long-term debt 
makes the liquidity shortage less likely outcome, long-tern loans can have a positive impact on 
investment.  In the first part of this paper, we estimate Tobin’s Q type investment functions of 
Japanese firms for two different sample periods.  In 1972-84, we find that the long-term loan ratio 
had an additional positive effect on investment.    However, in 1985-96, we cannot find that a higher 
ratio of long-term loans increased the Japanese firm’s investment.    The result indicates that the size 
of long-term loans had a great influence on the firm’s investment only at the early stage of the 
financial market development in Japan.  In the second part of this paper, we estimate investment 
functions of Korean and Taiwanese firms in the late 1990s.    In the late 1990s, Korea experienced a 
serious crisis, while the decline of Taiwanese economy was relatively moderate.çççWe, however, 
find that the long-term debt ratio had a significantly positive impact on the investment in both 
countries.    The result indicates that long-term funds might have mitigated the decline of investment 
regardless of the magnitude of the crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
  Financial markets are the most prominent means of channeling investment capital to its highest 
return uses.  These markets also provide liquidity and permit the efficient pooling of risk.   Both 
of these activities alter social composition of savings in a way that is potentially favorable to 
enhanced capital accumulation.   Noting these roles of financial markets, classical studies by 
Patrick (1966), Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) assert that 
the extent of financial intermediation in an economy affects rates of economic growth.      In general 
equilibrium framework, a similar connection between financial intermediation and growth has been 
investigated by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Obstfeld (1994), 
Fry (1995), and Greenwood and Smith (1997).  In these models, financial intermediaries alter the 
social composition of savings in a way that is potentially favorable to more productive, illiquid 
capital investment thorough liquidity provision and enhance capital accumulation.
1 
   In most developing countries, it is the banking sector that played a major role in the financial 
market.  As delegated monitors, banks specialize in gathering information about firms and reduce 
corporate myopia through overcoming the problems associated with informational asymmetry (for 
example, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984)).  The banks also play an important role in 
selecting good borrowers and in monitoring their ex-post performance (see, among others, Aoki 
(1994) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991)). 
 If banks could prevent unnecessary liquidation, these activities would have had a positive impact 
on economic growth.   However, to the extent that the debt maturity is short, there exists a 
probability of a liquidity shortage in the sense of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).  Thus, when 
panicking external creditors become unwilling to roll over existing short-term credits, otherwise 
solvent borrowers may suffer from the short-run liquidity problem.  The short-run liquidity 
problem tends to be serious at the early stage of economic development because internal funds are 
not sufficient for most of borrowers.  In particular, without prudential regulation nor a safety net, 
the liquidity problems of private bank loans may be intensified in the financial market. 
 The purpose of this paper is to estimate investment functions in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan and to 
examine the role of long-term loans for economic development in these countries.    We focus on the 
role of long-term loans because they are less mobile forms of capital flows.  When loans take the 
form of long-term contracts, it becomes costly for the external creditors to cancel them.    Thus, if a 
large fraction of the bank debt takes the form of long-term loans, investment would be larger 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
1    Empirical studies by Jung (1986), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Antje and Jovanovic (1993), and 
King and Levine (1993a, b) support their views and document a positive correlation between a variety of 
measures of financial activity and economic development.   However, the empirical findings are 
indecisive on causality between financial activity and economic development.  2 
because long-term loans would make the liquidity shortage less likely outcome.   
In the following analysis, we estimate Tobin’s Q type investment functions by using individual 
corporations’ financial data in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.  Provided that the concept mentioned 
above is right, restrained long-term loans would have restricted investment at the early stage of 
economic development, even if corporations had a high Tobin’s Q and a big size of cash flow.    We 
can thus expect that the ratio of long-term loans to total loans had an additionally positive effect on 
investment in the economy that has a potential liquidity risk in the financial market.   
  In the first part of this paper, we estimate investment functions of Japanese firms from 1972 to 
1996.  In post-war Japan, internal financing was highly limited, and issuing corporate bonds had 
been strictly regulated for most of the firms until the mid 1980s.    Under such circumstances, it was 
widely accepted that long-term funds provided by long-term credit banks and the Japan 
Development Bank played an important role for high economic growth.  In estimating the 
investment functions, we confirm this conventional view.  That is, we find that even if we allow 
various fundamental variables such as Tobin’s Q, profit, and cash flow, the long-term loan ratio had 
a significantly positive impact on the Japanese firms’ investment for the sample period 1972-1984.  
However, for the sample period 1985-1996, the coefficient of long-term loan ratio was never 
significantly positive.  The result implies that long-term loans had important roles for investment 
only at the early stage of development and that they came to lose their role during a past two decade 
in Japan. 
    In the second part of this paper, we estimate investment functions of Korean and Taiwanese firms 
in the late 1990s.    It is now widely recognized that a large fraction of short-term external liabilities 
was one of the main reasons why the East Asian countries had the serious crisis in 1997.      A large 
number of studies suggested that otherwise solvent East Asian countries might have suffered from a 
short-run liquidity problem because the available stock of reserves was low relative to the overall 
burden of external debt service (interest payments plus the renewal of loans coming to maturity).
2   
In particular, the East Asian crisis occurred when foreign lenders suddenly refused to roll over their 
bank loans in 1997.    This implies that if a large fraction of external liabilities had longer maturities, 
the East Asian crisis might not have taken place as the form of a liquidity shortage.    In the analysis, 
we examine whether this macroeconomic implication can be confirmed by the firm level data in 
Korea and Taiwan.  Korea is one of the East Asian countries that experienced a serious crisis in 
1997, while the decline of Taiwanese economy was relatively moderate during the crisis.çççWe, 
however, find that the long-term debt ratio had a significantly positive impact on the investment in 
both countries.    This indicates that long-term funds might have mitigated the decline of investment 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
2  For example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Furman and Stiglitz 
(1998), and Ito (1999).  3 
regardless of the magnitude of the crisis. 
This paper is organized as follows.    Section 2 discusses the roles of long-term funds in post-war 
Japan.  Section 3 sets out the investment functions and explains the data in Japan.  Section 4 
explains the construction procedure of capital stock and Tobin’s Q.    Section 5 presents the estimate 
results of the investment functions in Japan when the long-term fund ratios are added to explanatory 
variables.  Section 6 examines whether long-term funds have any different influences on 
investment between keiretsu-affiliated and non-affiliated firms.  Section 7 discusses the role of 
long-term funds in other East Asian countries.    Section 8 sets out the investment functions in Korea 
and Taiwan and section 9 presents their estimation results.  Finally, section 10 summarizes our 
main results and discusses remaining issues.  
ç
ç
2  The Roles of Long-Term Funds in Japan 
  In the following analysis, we first examine whether the long-term loan ratio had an additional 
positive effect on investment in Japan.    In post-war Japan, bank loans had been the major source of 
external funds for almost all firms.    Except for few firms, internal financing was highly limited, and 
issuing corporate bonds had been strictly regulated until the mid 1980s.    Thus, to the extent that the 
debt maturity was short, there existed a probability of a liquidity shortage for borrowing firms.   
However, some of the Japanese firms benefited from the policy-based allocation of “long-term 
loans” which might have mitigated the liquidity risk. 
Among Japanese policymakers, there was an implicit agreement that the policy-based finance 
allocated to specific fields of industry was successful in supporting the postwar high-growth.   In 
particular, it was widely accepted that long-term funds provided by long-term credit banks and the 
Japan Development Bank played an important role for high economic growth.  From the 
macroeconomic viewpoint, the policy-based allocation of long-term funds is warranted, if the 
allocated long-term funds had great external effects in increasing capital stock and production.  
However, without market failure, rolling over of short-term loans are essentially the same as long-
term loans.    It is, thus, not self-evident whether the policy-based allocation of long-term loans could 
effectively increase capital stock and production of specific corporations or not.   
In previous literature, there are several empirical studies that stressed the role of Japan 
Development Bank’s loans (henceforth called “JDB loans”) in increasing capital stock and 
production of specific industries and corporations.  For example, Horiuchi and Sui (1993) carried 
event studies of corporations listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange Second Section, and demonstrated 
JDB loans were apt to increase capital investment.  Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994) carried the 
similar studies, using company-specific data in the overall machinery industry, and came up with an  4 
outcome supporting the pump-priming effect of JDB loans.
 3  The weights of JDB loans among 
total external borrowings were, however, not so high except for a few corporations.  This paper, 
thus, empirically examines whether the total long-term loans ʵ not only JDB loans but also 
including private long-term loans ʵ had an effect of increasing capital investment of specific 
corporations in post-war Japan.     
A series of papers by Teranishi, et al. (e.g., Teranishi (1982), Takei and Teranishi (1991)) are 
outstanding studies, which proved that the policy-based allocation of the long-term loans contributed 
to increasing capital stock and production of specific industries during the high-growth period in 
postwar Japan.  However, the analyses by Teranishi and others relied solely on the aggregated 
time-series data.   In contrast, this paper tries to examine the appropriateness of their concept by 
estimating standard investment functions based on the panel data of individual Japanese firms. 
Our approach is similar to a large number of studies that estimate investment functions, using the 
panel data of Japanese firms.
4  In particular, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) 
estimated investment functions taking account of the role of “main banks” and demonstrated that a 
company belonging to an affiliated business group (“keiretu”) was less restricted by the liquidity 
constraint.
5   However, none of these studies focused on the role of long-term loans.  Although 
both the main bank and policy-based allocation of long-term funds were inherent features of Japan’s 
financial market in the high-growth period, the mechanism of affecting investment are intrinsically 
different from each other.  Therefore, to the extent that there was the possibility of a liquidity 
shortage, the allocation of long-term loans would have had a different effect on investment through 
lessening the constraints of long-term investment funds. 
ç
3. The Estimated Equation and the Data 
The following four sections examine what additional effects the long-term loan ratio had on 
investment of Japanese firms.  In the analysis, we use the financial data of each Japanese firm and 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
3  Higano (1986) is one of the earliest studies that reached the same conclusions without rigorous analysis.   
To the contrary, Horiuchi and Otaki (1987) analyzed related issues by using industry-level macro data, 
and proved that such effects were scanty in many industries.    Beason and Weinstein (1996) also came to 
a paradoxical conclusion that the more dependent an industry was on JDB loans, the lower was its growth 
rate.   
4  For example, Asako, Kuninori, Inoue, and Murase (1989, 1997), Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and Suzuki 
and Ogawa (1997).   
5 The conclusions of Hoshi et al. were confirmed by, for example, Okazaki and Horiuchi (1992) and 
Ogawa and Suzuki (1997).    Hayashi (1997), however, asserts that the conclusions of Hoshi et al. are not 
robustly supported when excluding some outliners.      5 
estimate Tobin’s Q type investment function as follows:     
 
(1)ç It/Kt ʹ  Constant term + α∗ Xt-1 + β∗ LONGt-1 ç  
 
where It = investment amounts in the period t, Kt = capital stocks in the period t, Xt = fundament 
variables such as Tobin’s Q, profit, and cash flow in the period t, and LONGt= the long-term loan 
ratio in the period t.  As referred to in the next section, Kt and Tobin’s Q are converted into the 
market values.   
In contrast with the standard investment functions, the long-term loan ratio (LONGt) is added to 
the explanatory variable in eq. (1).  This is because in the case that long-term funds impose 
different restrictions than short-term loans on investment, the size of long-term fund ratio affects the 
size of investment, even if the total amounts of loans are the same.  Providing that the concept 
mentioned in the preceding section holds true, thus, the long-term loan ratio is supposed to have a 
significantly positive impact on investment at the early stage of the financial market development.  
Since the impact of each fundamental variable is also positive, both coefficients α  and β  are, hence, 
expected to be significantly positive at the early stage of the financial market development. 
However, as the financial market develops, the potential risk of liquidity shortage becomes 
smaller.  Under such circumstances, the role of long-term loan ratio declines in stimulating 
investment.  It is thus expected that only coefficient α  has a statistically significant positive value 
and that coefficient β  becomes less significant for a recent sample period.       
In the following analysis, bank loans are divided into long-term and short-term ones. Loans with a 
maturity exceeding one year are defined as “long-term loans” and the ratio of long-term loans to 
total loans is defined as “long-term loan ratio”.  We use this definition because the maturities of 
bank loans are classified only into those below and above one year in the financial data.  As 
fundamental variables Xt’s, we use not only Tobin’s Q but also profit and cash flow that are 
normalized by dividing by the market value of capital stock respectively.  In order to avoid the 
problem of instantaneity bias, all the variables are estimated with a lag of one period.   
All the data in Japan are based on the data set contained in NEEDS-COMPANY by Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun.    Those data are originally based on individual corporations’ financial reports listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange First-Section and Second-Section.  The data cover the period from 1970 
through 1996.  The estimation period is from 1972 through 1996.
6  The analysis covers 
corporations belonging to the five industries of iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, 
electrical equipment, and transportation equipment (including ship building and automobile 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
6  Many companies close their books in March, but not all the companies covered by the analysis did so.   
Data are, thus, arranged on the basis of calendar year when books were closed.  6 
manufacturing).  For each industry, the investment functions are estimated by the panel analysis 
(the fixed effect model and random effect model) including corporation dummies and time dummies.   
As to those corporations whose data were partially missing in the estimation period, we included 
their data by using an unbalanced panel analysis.   
 
4. The Estimation of Capital Stock 
In calculating the market value of capital stocks of Japanese firms, we first apply the perpetual 
inventory method for four types of capital stocks: (a) buildings and structures, (b) machinery and 
equipment, (c) vessels and vehicles, and (d) land.    We then added up the converted capital stocks to 
calculate the aggregate capital stocks of individual corporations.
7  Except for land, the values of 
1970 were taken as the benchmark, on the assumption that this year’s book values of individual 
capital stocks are equal to their market prices.
8  
For deflector, we used the wholesale price index (p
Ii
t) corresponding to each investment goods i.   
Specifically, we used the wholesale price index of construction materials for buildings and structures, 
the wholesale price index of machinery and tools for machinery and equipment, and the wholesale 
price index of transportation equipment for vessels and vehicles as the deflectors.  Each nominal 
gross investment is calculated by adding the book values of capital depreciation to the increments of 
each fixed asset.
9    Dividing the nominal gross investment by the investment goods deflector results 
in the real gross investments (Ii,t) of each individual tangible fixed asset.   
The physical depreciation rate of capital stocks (δ
i) is calculated according to Hayashi and Inoue 
(1991) and Hulten and Wykoff (1981).  They estimate the rates of asset depreciation at 0.047 for 
buildings and adjunctive equipment, at 0.09489 for machinery and equipment, and at 0.1470 for 
vessels and vehicles and transportation equipment.
10 
Upon obtaining the bench marks for capital stocks, real gross investments, and depreciation rates, 
we can calculate the real values of each individual capital stocks represented by the index i by the 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
7 Tools, apparatus and fixtures are not included in capital stocks, because their values are much smaller 
than those of other capital stocks. 
8  For example, discrepancies at the time of 1970, if any, would have less substantial effect on estimation, 
since the estimation periods start from 1972. 
9 Data from the NIKKEI NEEDS do not tell the book values of capital stock-specific  depreciation, so 
that the book values of capital stock-specific depreciation were calculated by allocating the total book 
values of capital stock depreciation (net of land) in proportion to the book values of each individual 
capital stock. 
10  For the depreciation rate of structures, estimated at 0.0564 by Hulten and Wykoff, we used a 0.047 rate 
identical to that of buildings and adjunctive equipment.  7 
following expression:   
 
(2)ç Ki,t = (1-δ
i)Ki,t-1 + Ii,t 
 
The market value of capital stocks (p
Ii
tKi,t) can be obtained by multiplying the real stock values by 
the deflector of capital goods (p
Ii
t).  
The series of land stock are also calculated using the perpetual inventory method.  The 
benchmark year is 1970, as is the case with other stocks.  However, since the discrepancies 
between the market prices and book values were large, the benchmark for the market prices of land 
was obtained by multiplying the book values in 1970 by a 5.27.     The value of 5.27 is the average 
ratio of market price to book value in 1970 calculated by Ogawa and Kitasaka (1998).  In 
calculating the ratio, they divided the market prices of the land owned by private non-financial 
corporations capitalized less than ¥10 million by the book values of the land owned by overall 
industry, based on the Annual Report on National Accounts (the Economic Planning Agency) and 
the Quarterly Corporations Statistics (the Ministry of Finance).   
The increases in the market value of land are calculated by the increases in the book values.   
However, the decreases in the book value of land, i.e. sold-out land, are converted into market prices 
based on the LIFO (last-in-first-out) assumption that the sold-out land was purchased at the last 
purchase point of time.    In previous studies, Hoshi and Kashyap (1990), Ogawa (1990) and Ogawa 
and Suzuki (1997) used the similar assumption.  The land price (p
L
t) used for the deflector is the 
“national index of urban land” (the average price for overall purposes), excluding six major cities, 
based on the Index of Urban Land Price (Japan Real Estate Institute). 
Define the increase in the book value of land by ILANDt and its decrease by DLANDt.  Then,  the 
market value of land investment (NILANDt), the market value of land stock (LANDYt= p
L
tLt), and the 
real value of land net investment (ILt) can respectively be calculated by the following equations: 
 









t-1)*DLANDt-1  ʴ  NILANDt, 






      On the other hand, Tobin’s average Q is calculated as follows:   
 
(6) Tobin’s  Q  ʹç
∑
−




t t t t t t t
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where Vt = corporation’s market price represented by its share price, LIBt = total liabilities, CURt =  8 
current asset, CONSRt = construction in process, INTANt = intangible fixed asset, OTHERt = 
financial investment and other assets, and DEFt = deferred asset.
11 
In the following analysis, we estimate the investment functions based on the market value of 
capital stock with and without land.    Hence, when we use the market value of capital stock without 
land, we calculate the Tobin’s Q by deducting the market value of land (p
L
tLt) from both numerator 
and denominator in (6).   
Table 1 shows average values and standard deviations of estimated Tobin’s Qs with and without 
land in the five industries of iron and steel (50 companies), nonferrous metals (76 companies), 
chemicals (125 companies), electrical equipment (186 companies) and transport equipment (79 
companies, including shipbuilding and automobile manufacturing).  It indicates that Tobin’s Q 
without land has a smaller standard deviation than Tobin’s Q with land, which suggests that Tobin’s 
Qs have small dispersions without land in each industry.  By contrast, in the electrical equipment 
industry, the values of Tobin’s Q as well as standard deviations are large in general.    Regardless of 
whether land is included in capital stocks, the average value of Tobin’s Qs is close to 1 in other four 
industries (iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals and transportation equipment), which is 
consistent with the economic theory.   
 
5    The Results of Estimation in Japan 
This section estimates the investment function represented by eq. (1), using the data series of 
“capital stock” and “Tobin’s Q” prepared in the preceding section.  According to Fukuda, Ji, and 
Nakamura [1998], the flow of long-term funds showed a substantial structural change in the mid-
1980s.  We thus split the period of estimation into 1972-84 (before the financial market develops) 
and 1985-96 (after the financial market develops).  We then attempt a panel analysis of the fixed 
effect model and the random effect model, including a corporation dummy and time dummy, with 
respect to each of the five industries (iron and steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals, electrical 
equipment and transport equipment).
12  
Table 2 shows the results of estimation, using capital stocks including land.  The results for the 
period of 1972-84 are shown in Table 2-1 and those for the period of 1985-96 in Table 2-2.    Firstly, 
the estimates of “α ”, which is the coefficient of fundamental variables, are positive both before and 
after the mid-1980s, and supports the standard theoretical results.    The results remain the same even 
when either Tobin’s Q, the profit rate, or cash flow is used as a fundamental variable.    The t-values 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
11 Except for stock prices, any of the variables is based on the financial data of individual corporations.  
Share prices are stock prices adjusted for dividend off. 
12  Since shipbuilding is peculiar in the transportation industry, estimations were attempted for both of the 
cases including and excluding shipbuilding firms.  9 
are also statistically significant, except for the random effect model for the iron and steel industry.   
However, the estimates of “β ”, which is the coefficient of the long-term loan ratio, are completely 
different between 1972-84 and 1985-96.    That is, the estimates of β  are all positive in 1972-84.    In 
particular, t-values are significantly different from zero except for chemicals, and the results have 
goodness of fit.    The result supports the hypothesis that even with the total amounts of loans being 
given, the long-term loans had an additional positive impact on investment at the early stage of the 
financial market development.     
In 1985-96, by contrast, the estimates of β  never take a significantly positive value.      In the two 
industries of iron/steel and nonferrous metals, they are positive but are not statistically significant.  
In the three industries of chemicals, electrical equipment and transportation equipment, they become 
negative.    This means long-term loans have had no significantly positive impact on investment after 
the mid-1980s when the financial liberalization progressed.     
The above results are robust even when we use different explanatory variables.  For example, 
Table 3 indicates the results of estimation when we use capital stocks without land.  The 
comparison between Table 2 and Table 3 show slight differences in the estimates of individual 
coefficient.  However, the estimates in both tables are almost similar in sign and statistical 
significance, which supports our hypothesis even in the case that capital stocks do not include land.   
In Table 4, we set out the results of estimation in the case where both Tobin’s Q and profit (or 
cash flow) are used as explanatory variables to estimate eq. (1).
13  The theory implies that Tobin’s 
Q is a sufficient statistic for investment if the market works perfectly.    However, previous empirical 
studies showed that since corporations face with liquidity constraints, profits and cash flows have an 
important explanatory power in estimating an investment function even if Tobin’s Q is included in 
the explanatory variable.  The results in Table 4 reconfirm this previous result in any industry and 
any period, suggesting that many Japanese corporations faced with liquidity constraints throughout 
the periods.   
However, as far as we focus our attention to the coefficient of long-term loan ratio, “β ”, the 
inclusion of plural fundamental variables has nothing to do with the estimated results.  That is, 
Table 4 shows that as in Table 2, the estimates of “β ” are all positive in the 1972-84 period, while 
those in the 1985-96 period never take significantly positive values.  This indicates that although 
profit or cash flow might ease the short-term liquidity constraints, they could never help reducing the 
constraints of long-term funds at the early stage of the financial market development.    This implies 
that the long-term constraints should be separated from the short-term liquidity constraints at least 
before the financial market develops in Japan. 
 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
13  Without loss of generality, we reported the case where capital stocks include land in Table 4.  10
 
6    The Roles of the Keiretsu Corporate Grouping   
In the preceding section, we have demonstrated that up to the mid-1980s, a higher ratio of long-
term loans had a positive effect on investment even when we include fundamental variables such as 
Tobin’s Q in the explanatory variables.    We have also indicated that the effect of the long-term loan 
ratio has nothing to do with the size of profit or cash flow, and that the constraints due to a shortage 
of long-term funds are essentially different from short-term liquidity constraints caused by a 
shortage of cash flows.   
This section examines the robustness of the latter implication by looking at whether the effect of 
long-term loan ratio on investment is different between keiretsu-affiliated corporations and non-
affiliated ones.  Some of previous studies proposed that a corporation belonging to a keiretsu 
corporate grouping faces lesser liquidity constraints.  If policy-based allocation of long-term loans 
is an alternative means to ease liquidity constraints, then the proposition implies that the allocated 
long-term loans would have had stronger effects on investment for non-affiliated corporations than 
for affiliated one.   
Loans from main banks, however, are basically short-term funds and have the role of easing short-
term liquidity constraints such as working funds.    By contrast, the policy-based long-term funds are 
provided in anticipation of mid- and long term prospects of a corporation.    Therefore, at least in the 
period when there existed a possibility of a liquidity shortage, the allotment of long-term funds 
might have served to lessen the constraints of long-term funds.     
Splitting corporations into two groups of keiretsu-affiliated corporations and non-affiliated ones, 
we shall estimate the investment function represented by eq. (1) with respect to each group.  We 
compare the estimates of “β ”, a coefficient to indicate the effects of long-term fund ratio on 
investment, between keiretsu-affiliated corporations and non-affiliated ones.  As far as the above 
conception is correct, no substantial differences are supposed to exist between keiretsu-affiliated 
corporations and non-affiliated ones concerning the effects of long-term loans on investment     
Based on the 1995 version of Keiretsu no Kenkyu by the Economic Research Institute, the 
corporations belonging to the four corporate groupings or the six corporate groupings are assorted 
into “keiretsu-affiliated companies” and the others are assorted into “non-affiliated companies”.  
The period of time covered by the following analysis is 1972-84.  This is because the preceding 
section observed that long-term funds had a positive effect on investment in this period.  As the 
result of splitting corporations into two groups, the sample size for each estimation becomes reduced.   
Thus, in the following estimations, we attempt a panel analysis by way of pooling all the data of 
corporations belonging to the five industries, rather than make industry-specific estimations.   
Table 5 reports the results of estimation when we use capital stock including land.    The estimates 
of “α ”, which is the coefficient of fundamental variables, take positive values regardless of whether  11 
corporations belong to keiretsu corporate groupings or not, and their t-values are all significantly 
different from zero.  However, the coefficients of Tobin’s Q are bigger for keiretsu-affiliated 
companies than for non-affiliated companies, which may show keiretsu-affiliated companies have 
closer relations between Tobin’s Q.   
In contrast, the estimates of “β ”, which is the coefficient of “long-term fund ratio”, take positive 
values regardless of whether corporations belong to keiretsu-affiliated groupings or not. The 
estimates themselves are almost the same between corporate groups, but they are a little bit larger for 
keiretsu-affiliated companies than those for non-affiliated ones.  These results clearly do not 
support the hypothesis that even before the mid-1980s, long-term funds had larger effects on the 
investment of non-affiliated companies than on the investment of keiretsu-affiliated companies.      It 
is thus evident that long-term funds had not served as an alternative to ease short-term liquidity 
constraints in non-affiliated companies.   
Our findings, however, indicate that long-term funds have a slightly bigger effect on the 
investment of keiretsu-affiliated companies than on those of non-affiliated ones. This property of 
long-term funds is not statistically significant.  However, if that is true, main banks and long-term 
funds have mutually supplemental effects on easing liquidity constraints.  That is, long-term funds 
had significantly affected investment at least until the mid-1980s, while they had been more 
effective in the way of corporate groups whose liquidity had been less limited because of the main 
bank’s support.    This consequence conforms to the hypothesis attained by Horiuchi and Sui (1993), 
and would be worthy of closer scrutiny in our future researches.   
 
 
7. The Role of Long-term Funds in Other East Asian Countries 
  The purpose of the following sections is to estimate the investment functions of Korean and 
Taiwanese firms in the late 1990s.  It is now widely recognized that a large fraction of short-term 
external liabilities was one of the main reasons why the East Asian countries had the serious crisis.    
In particular, the East Asian crisis occurred when foreign lenders suddenly refused to roll over their 
bank loans in 1997.    This implies that if a large fraction of external liabilities had longer maturities, 
the East Asian crisis might not have taken place as the form of a liquidity shortage. 
    When we look at the time-series data of international bank loans based on the BIS data, the degree 
of capital mobility was quite different in different terms to maturity.  Table 6 shows the semi-
annual growth rates of international bank loans to the East Asian economies before and after the 
crisis in three different types of maturities: maturities up to one year (short-term loans), maturities 
over one year and up to two years (medium-term loans), and maturities over two years (long-term  12
loans).
14    It suggests that until 1997, bank loans to the East Asian economies had steadily increased 
in almost all terms to maturity.   In Thailand from 1994 to 1995, the average semi-annual growth 
rate of short-term loans was close to 20% and those of middle-term and long-term loans were 
slightly higher than 20%.  Similarly, both short-term and long-term loans grew on average about 
10% in Indonesia and about 15% in Korea from 1994 to 1996. 
      In contrast, after the crisis, bank loans declined sharply only for short-term loans.    In Korea, the 
semi-annual growth rate of short-term loans was –16.12% in December 1997 and –44.23% in June 
1998 (see Fig. 1a).      But, during the same period, the semi-annual growth rates of middle-term and 
long-term loans were still significantly positive in Korea (see Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c).  Similarly, 
almost all of the other East Asian economies experienced significant decline of short-term loans 
from December 1997 to June 1998.  However, except for Thailand in December 1997, they 
experienced no serious decline in middle-term and long-term loans for the same period.   Instead, 
several East Asian economies experienced significant increase in middle-term and long-term loans 
during this period (see Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c). 
In general, liquidity problems emerge when panicking external creditors become unwilling to roll 
over existing credits.  Thus, if panicking external creditors could cancel their long-term contracts, 
liquidity problems might have happened even when external liabilities were financed by long-term 
loans.  However, the above evidence in the East Asian economies suggests that like direct 
investment, long-term commercial loans were less mobile forms of capital flows.  This may imply 
that if a large fraction of international commercial bank debt took the form of long-term loans, the 
East Asian crisis might not have taken place at least as a liquidity shortage.  The purpose of the 
following two sections is to examine whether we can confirm this implication when we estimate the 
firm level investment functions in Korea and Taiwan. 
ç
 
8. The Estimation of Investment Functions in Korea and Taiwan 
In this section, we shall identify what additional effects the long-term loan ratio had on individual 
investment of Korean and Taiwanese firms in the late 1990s.  By using the financial data of non-
financial companies in Korea and Taiwan, we estimate the following investment function:   
 
(7)ç It/Kt ʹ  Constant term + α∗ Xt + β∗ LONGDt + γ * DEBTt- 
 
where Xt = fundament variables such as profit rate in the period t, LONGDt= the long-term debt ratio 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
14  The data sources are BIS, The Maturity, Sectoral and Nationality Distribution of International 
Bank Lending, various issues, from 96.6 to 97.12 and BIS, International Banking and Financial 
Market Development, August 1998, for 98.6.  13
in the period t, and DEBTt = the debt-asset ratio in the period t.     
    The investment function is analogous to that we estimated for Japanese firms in previous sections. 
In particular, the long-term debt ratio (LONGDt), which is defined by the ratio of long-term debt to 
total liability, is added as an explanatory variable to capture the effect of the long-term fund ratio on 
investment.
15  As fundamental variables Xt‘s, we use a profit that is normalized by total asset.  
Providing that the concept mentioned in the preceding section holds true, both coefficients α  and β  
are expected to be significantly positive. 
Capital stock is defined by tangible assets with an expected useful life of over one year, which 
include land, buildings, machinery, equipment, construction work in progress, and so on.  Because 
of the data limitation, we used the book values of the capital stock and total asset for Korean and 
Taiwanese firms.  In case of Korea, we also included the debt-asset ratio, which is defined by the 
ratio of total liability to total asset, in an explanatory variable.  If the debt-overhang exists, the 
coefficient γ  will be negative. 
All the data used for estimation are based on the data set contained in World Scope.  The  data  set 
is originally based on individual corporations’ financial reports in Korea and Taiwan.  The 
estimation period is from 1995 through 1999.  The analysis covers all non-financial corporations 
for which the data is available at least for two consecutive years.  The number of covered 
companies is 249 in the case of Korea and 219 in the case of Taiwan. 
Pooling all available data for each country, the investment function is estimated by the ordinary 
least square, the fixed effect model, and the random effect model.    As to those corporations whose 
data were partially missing in the estimation period, we included their data by using an unbalanced 
panel analysis.   
 
 
9. The Estimation Results 
(i) Korea 
    Table 7 shows the results of estimation for Korea.    We estimate the investment function in Korea 
with and without the debt-asset ratio.  As for the profit, we used the ordinary profit which 
represents the operating profit plus any non-operating net income. 
The coefficient of the profit rate always takes a significantly positive value, implying that the 
profitable firms had larger investment in Korea.  However, the coefficient of the long-term debt 
ratio is also significantly positive in most estimates.    The result supports the view that even with the 
profit rate and the total amounts of external debt being given, the long-term debt had an additional 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
15 In the analysis, “the long-term debt” is defined by all interest bearing financial obligations, excluding 
amounts due within one year.      14
positive impact on investment in Korea in the late 1990s. 
Korea is one of the East Asian countries that had experienced a serious crisis in 1997.  A large 
number of Korean companies had suffered from a short-run liquidity problem since foreign lenders 
suddenly refused to roll over their bank loans in November 1997.    Our result, however, implies that 
even under such panicking circumstances, Korean companies with a large fraction of long-term 
external debt had smaller risk of a liquidity shortage and had relatively mild declines of investment. 
The implication becomes more clear-cut when the debt-asset ratio is included as an explanatory 
variableõ  In this estimate, the coefficient of the debt-asset ratio is always significantly negative.  
This implies that there was a possibility of “debt-overhang” in the sense that Korean companies with 
heavy external debt had a difficulty to finance their investment funds during the crisis period.  
However, the coefficient of the long-term debt ratio almost doubled and became more significant 
when the debt-asset ratio was included as an explanatory variable.  This implies that the long-term 
debt might have mitigated the decline of investment caused by the debt-overhang during the crisis 
period in Korea. 
  
(ii) Taiwan 
Table 8 shows the estimation results in Taiwan.  In estimating the investment function, we first 
estimated the investment function with and without the debt-asset ratio.  However, the debt-asset 
ratio was never statistically significant.  The table thus reports the estimation results without the 
debt-asset ratio.  As for the profit, we used the general income, which represents the difference 
between sales or revenues minus cost of goods sold and depreciation, or the difference of sales.     
The coefficient of the profit rate takes positive value in all estimates and is statistically significant 
in most of the estimates, implying that the profitable firms had larger amounts of investment in 
Taiwan.  However, the coefficient of the long-term debt ratio is also significantly positive except 
for the fixed effect model.  The result thus weakly supports the view that even with the profit rate 
and the total amounts of external debt being given, the long-term debt had an additional positive 
impact on investment in Taiwan in the late 1990s. 
The decline of Taiwanese economy was relatively moderate during the crisis.    Thus, to the extent 
that their profit rates are high, Taiwanese companies had no serious difficulty to finance their 
investment funds during the crisis even if they heavy external debt.      Our result, however, suggests 
that even in such Taiwanese economy, the long-term debt had an additional positive impact on 
investment in the late 1990s. 
 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we estimated investment functions in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in order to identify  15
the role of long-term funds for economic growth.    When there is a possibility of a liquidity shortage, 
the firm’s investment decision tends to be conservative.    Thus, to the extent that the long-term debt 
makes the liquidity shortage less likely outcome, long-tern loans can have a positive impact on 
investment.  Our estimations in Japan have demonstrated that corporations with a higher ratio of 
long-term loans made significantly larger amounts of investment only before the mid 1980s.  This 
implies that a higher ratio of long-term loans gave an incentive to make significantly big amounts of 
investment only at the early stage of financial market development.  In contrast, we found that the 
long-term loan ratio had a significantly positive impact on the investment in Korea and Taiwan in 
the late 1990s.  Korea is one of the East Asian countries that had experienced a serious crisis in 
1997, while the decline of Taiwanese economy was relatively moderate during the crisis.  Our 
estimation results imply that the long-term loan ratio played an important role in these different 
types of countries during the crisis. 
    In interpreting our estimation results, however, we need to keep in mind several limitations of our 
analysis.  First, because of estimating corporation-specific investment functions, our analysis does 
not necessarily identify how large impacts the long-term funds had for macroeconomic growth.  
From the macroeconomic viewpoint, the allocation of long-term funds is warranted, if the allocated 
long-term funds had great external effects in increasing capital stock and production.  To measure 
the external effects, we thus need to analyze not only corporation-specific investment but also the 
interaction of investment among firms and industries. 
  Secondly, even though the long-term debt ratio had a positive impact on investment, it does not 
necessarily mean that a source of the impact is the reduction of the liquidity risk.  The long-term 
funds can affect the investment in various respects.  We need further researches to identify that 
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Publishers. Table 1  Descriptive Statistic of Tobin’s Q in Japan
(1) The case of capital stock including land
Average Standard  Number of
Deviation Samples
Iron & Steel
1971-84 1.03603 1.66485 643
1975-84 1.05668 1.90303 471
1985-96 1.35711 1.04978 596
Nonferrous Metals
1971-84 1.10598 1.09497 877
1975-84 1.06007 0.97028 641
1985-96 1.83458 2.10871 861
Chemicals
1971-84 1.29397 1.80299 1549
1975-84 1.28881 1.84053 1127
1985-96 1.6025 1.62928 1456
Electrical Equipment
1971-84 3.67443 8.05434 2004
1975-84 3.83776 8.81992 1466
1985-96 2.9081 4.99273 2088
Transportation Equipment
1971-84 1.248 1.65817 954
1975-84 1.12298 1.36916 690
1985-96 1.17314 0.99024 896
(2) The case of capital stock not including land
Average Standard  Number of
Deviation Samples
Iron & Steel
1971-84 1.00985 2.19623 643
1975-84 1.02183 2.46776 471
1985-96 1.57453 1.69316 596
Nonferrous Metals
1971-84 1.02067 2.21587 877
1975-84 0.89046 2.12955 641
1985-96 2.48359 4.49438 861
Chemicals
1971-84 1.42381 2.87749 1549
1975-84 1.37989 2.69617 1127
1985-96 1.94832 2.55941 1456
Electrical Equipment
1971-84 5.36245 13.80353 2004
1975-84 5.35215 14.39372 1466
1985-96 4.03135 8.50317 2088
Transportation Equipment
1971-84 1.3346 2.51165 954
1975-84 1.11799 1.92877 690
1985-96 1.36135 1.72395 896
㈰Table 2  Estimation of the Investment Function in Japan
 - The Case of Capital Stock Including Land
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01969 3.36905 *** 0.00364 1.21368
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.15852 4.00559 *** 0.08619 3.32876 ***
Hausman Test 0.00060
Profit Rate 0.23928 5.92602 *** 0.23996 6.60785 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.13412 3.81007 *** 0.07726 3.34671 ***
Hausman Test 0.09110
Cash Flow 0.48316 6.88681 *** 0.49278 7.82164 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.12517 3.58300 *** 0.07731 3.43371 ***
Hausman Test 0.19270
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02929 7.40403 *** 0.02114 6.76576 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.12175 5.49077 *** 0.05204 3.57734 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.04544 4.25576 *** 0.06079 6.21874 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.09952 4.52212 *** 0.04533 3.27160 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.03248 3.09956 *** 0.04514 4.47638 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.10155 4.59238 *** 0.04896 3.41484 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01759 6.12598 *** 0.01528 7.74153 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01348 0.67343 0.00337 0.25623
Hausman Test 0.41570
Profit Rate 0.23751 6.63199 *** 0.23724 8.61837 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02587 1.33921 0.02241 1.72260 *
Hausman Test 0.97100
Cash Flow 0.64533 10.16410 *** 0.60358 12.27330 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00331 0.17420 0.00193 0.15407
Hausman Test 0.56980
㈱Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00713 9.09618 *** 0.00311 8.28647 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05728 4.33098 *** 0.03138 3.68161 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.08984 10.17110 *** 0.10536 19.19240 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.03709 2.94382 *** 0.02653 3.24918 ***
Hausman Test 0.05640
Cash Flow 0.12675 8.78237 *** 0.18321 19.07750 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04108 3.24313 *** 0.02295 2.86690 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01353 5.51411 *** 0.00828 5.22660 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05994 3.07577 *** 0.01561 1.37328
Hausman Test 0.00020
Profit Rate 0.50024 11.84460 *** 0.38309 10.88100 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05288 25.94311 *** 0.02711 2.37180 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.38470 7.67576 *** 0.35071 8.74403 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06353 3.39113 *** 0.02816 2.34296 **
Hausman Test 0.02980
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01332 5.46319 *** 0.00800 5.02923 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04652 2.38107 ** 0.01276 1.10863
Hausman Test 0.00110
Profit Rate 0.52497 11.07710 *** 0.38382 10.06270 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04489 2.48040 ** 0.02632 2.29220 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.44113 8.10354 *** 0.38049 8.89105 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05211 2.78745 *** 0.02337 1.92902 *
Hausman Test 0.03450
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level
㈲Table 2  Estimation of the Investment Function in Japan
 - The Case of Capital Stock Including Land
(2) The Period of Estimation : 19785-1996
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02102 4.72586 *** 0.01963 5.30099 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01261 0.50685 0.01802 1.20266
Hausman Test 0.80200
Profit Rate 0.33697 6.35166 *** 0.30004 6.89531 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01606 0.65757 0.01992 1.33725
Hausman Test 0.44880
Cash Flow 0.41463 4.60787 *** 0.41897 5.54659 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00776 0.31281 0.01684 1.13713
Hausman Test 0.89930
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02340 12.05080 *** 0.01633 13.27620 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.00571 -0.38356 0.00305 0.30521
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.21989 11.38240 *** 0.24469 15.41560 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00113 0.07496 0.00304 0.30275
Hausman Test 0.07410
Cash Flow 0.55194 7.03328 *** 0.61720 10.31280 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00303 0.19062 -0.00225 -0.19997
Hausman Test 0.39370
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01606 10.62500 *** 0.01465 11.84170 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02827 -2.92174 *** -0.01444 -2.30441 **
Hausman Test 0.02680
Profit Rate 0.56287 13.99360 *** 0.41394 14.00530 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03662 -3.91507 *** -0.01241 -1.89925 *
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.82438 13.21670 *** 0.59493 14.52390 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03081 -3.26878 *** -0.01405 -2.27245 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
㈳Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00665 16.31400 *** 0.00535 15.37660 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05797 -6.15343 *** -0.03975 -5.68001 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.01299 3.31561 *** 0.03076 9.47366 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07549 -7.42380 *** -0.04531 -5.99826 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.03501 4.50396 *** 0.07102 10.90000 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07560 -7.45556 *** -0.04490 -6.04456 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02641 9.73145 *** 0.02272 9.45658 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07390 -5.58965 *** -0.03386 -3.75077 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.30828 5.43849 *** 0.33144 7.00603 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09195 -6.91573 *** -0.03874 -4.56754 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.38173 7.34442 *** 0.42873 9.76243 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09397 -7.18984 *** -0.03667 -4.60130 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02653 9.00998 *** 0.02284 8.95300 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07830 -5.67609 *** -0.03054 -3.32208 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.47898 6.96148 *** 0.45624 8.30453 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09474 -6.98014 *** -0.03627 -4.22991 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.41830 7.64527 *** 0.45064 9.42059 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09920 -7.37539 *** -0.03876 -4.64083 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level, and * significant at a 10% level. 
㈴Table 3  Estimation of the Investment Function in Japan
 - The Case of Capital Stock not Including Land
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02094 4.00502 *** 0.00293 1.18518
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.18669 3.87254 *** 0.06937 2.51451 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.19477 6.31057 *** 0.19457 7.12831 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.16264 3.79182 *** 0.08890 3.10400 ***
Hausman Test 0.06620
Cash Flow 0.37328 6.72610 *** 0.38767 7.86953 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.15095 3.52746 *** 0.08513 3.04626 ***
Hausman Test 0.12660
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01275 5.34436 *** 0.01035 5.41164 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.15741 5.64925 *** 0.07985 4.22287 ***
Hausman Test 0.00030
Profit Rate 0.01896 2.40453 ** 0.02660 3.55514 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.12895 4.66814 *** 0.07106 3.65767 ***
Hausman Test 0.00120
Cash Flow 0.01137 1.52323 0.01637 2.25505 **
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.13129 4.74521 *** 0.07186 3.64948 ***
Hausman Test 0.00160
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01453 5.90531 *** 0.01296 7.38000 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02046 0.81826 0.00084 0.04999
Hausman Test 0.34560
Profit Rate 0.29928 11.74630 *** 0.23447 13.09600 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04513 1.92745 * 0.03102 2.19584 **
Hausman Test 0.00130
Cash Flow 0.66355 14.71750 *** 0.61330 16.73010 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01014 0.44286 0.00428 0.27676
Hausman Test 0.14020
㈵Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00433 9.02277 *** 0.00203 7.61229 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06232 3.89284 *** 0.03520 3.33938 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.09444 13.22770 *** 0.07363 18.25010 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04525 2.98386 *** 0.03750 3.64927 ***
Hausman Test 0.00090
Cash Flow 0.14712 11.78210 *** 0.13994 19.26090 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05292 3.46623 *** 0.03268 3.36645 ***
Hausman Test 0.15840
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01224 6.53538 *** 0.00765 5.81919 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07303 3.04181 *** 0.02361 1.60600
Hausman Test 0.00010
Profit Rate 0.37490 14.41180 *** 0.29698 13.07600 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06036 2.78617 *** 0.04482 2.96741 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.34762 9.71679 *** 0.32043 10.81260 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07297 3.18682 *** 0.03885 2.60487 ***
Hausman Test 0.05400
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01203 6.50145 *** 0.00745 5.66550 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05457 2.28150 ** 0.01946 1.31304
Hausman Test 0.00030
Profit Rate 0.37131 13.09160 *** 0.28290 11.71300 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04868 2.22647 ** 0.04157 2.75668 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.38667 10.08800 *** 0.34227 10.92760 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05669 2.49727 ** 0.03290 2.19933 **
Hausman Test 0.04980
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level
㈶Table 3  Estimation of the Investment Function in Japan
 - The Case of Capital Stock not Including Land
(2) The Period of Estimation : 1985-1996
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01464 3.55132 *** 0.01374 3.86585 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01177 0.31602 0.01596 0.67648
Hausman Test 0.89130
Profit Rate 0.23998 5.17110 *** 0.23857 6.18780 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01059 0.28837 0.01905 0.85964
Hausman Test 0.95590
Cash Flow 0.28341 3.70388 *** 0.32331 4.76509 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00610 0.16419 0.01856 0.82218
Hausman Test 0.49890
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00895 8.63041 *** 0.00719 9.61816 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00593 0.30010 -0.00277 -0.22178
Hausman Test 0.03950
Profit Rate 0.10155 9.04343 *** 0.10733 11.35960 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01880 0.97655 0.00375 0.29715
Hausman Test 0.38610
Cash Flow 0.42637 9.42043 *** 0.42380 11.21760 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02389 1.24507 0.00718 0.55368
Hausman Test 0.49070
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00913 8.00727 *** 0.00840 8.96572 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02082 -1.78836 * -0.01051 -1.44074
Hausman Test 0.21370
Profit Rate 0.38000 12.03480 *** 0.28356 12.19400 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02793 -2.47049 ** -0.00490 -0.63917
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.58952 14.07110 *** 0.52588 15.96340 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.01926 -1.73509 * -0.00995 -1.27082
Hausman Test 0.02160
㈷Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00428 13.79430 *** 0.00331 13.15170 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.04080 -3.68057 *** -0.02647 -3.45571 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.02988 10.64290 *** 0.03541 15.36220 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05524 -4.78488 *** -0.02802 -3.53749 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.05373 10.93310 *** 0.06681 15.94540 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05616 -4.87231 *** -0.02867 -3.66910 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01630 8.83862 *** 0.01371 8.30269 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07433 -4.61038 *** -0.03070 -2.86111 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.30108 7.72921 *** 0.28876 8.66557 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08732 -5.55105 *** -0.03576 -3.56433 ***
Hausman Test 0.00010
Cash Flow 0.32538 8.73387 *** 0.37081 11.19690 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08873 -5.69572 *** -0.03095 -3.40080 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01608 7.96775 *** 0.01364 7.76371 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08316 -5.00217 *** -0.02615 -2.45825 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Profit Rate 0.36513 7.44940 *** 0.33955 8.54885 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09220 -5.72916 *** -0.03106 -3.10939 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Cash Flow 0.33453 8.49130 *** 0.36749 10.29080 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.09770 -6.14336 *** -0.03263 -3.44868 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level
㈸Table 4  Estimation of the Investment Function in Japan
- The Case of Tobin’s Q and Other Fundamental Variables being Included Together
(1) The Period of Estimation : 1972-1984
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01480 2.52077 ** 0.00065 0.22213
Profit Rate 0.18922 4.21582 *** 0.20894 5.19609 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.14874 3.81029 *** 0.08319 3.34127 ***
Hausman Test 0.00990
Tobin's Q 0.01481 2.55588 ** 0.00057 0.19800
Cash Flow 0.39203 5.07253 *** 0.43213 6.19534 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.14067 3.62098 *** 0.08395 3.42740 ***
Hausman Test 0.01480
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.03011 7.64267 *** 0.02177 7.07101 ***
Profit Rate 0.03447 3.21628 *** 0.04109 3.90366 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.11633 5.26363 *** 0.04726 3.31835 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.03071 7.75473 *** 0.02255 7.26786 ***
Cash Flow 0.03090 3.09070 *** 0.03756 3.79999 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.11666 5.27636 *** 0.04686 3.28804 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01449 5.00499 *** 0.01087 5.19328 ***
Profit Rate 0.20906 5.49123 *** 0.17388 5.74132 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.02416 1.21442 0.01350 1.03033
Hausman Test 0.11700
Tobin's Q 0.01258 4.43980 *** 0.00833 4.09145 ***
Cash Flow 0.62760 9.34476 *** 0.53241 9.74646 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.00517 0.26632 -0.00169 -0.13269
Hausman Test 0.01350
㈹Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00499 6.20054 *** 0.00112 2.75852 ***
Profit Rate 0.14365 8.66795 *** 0.13290 9.93400 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04863 3.75058 *** 0.02825 3.48865 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.00618 7.78379 *** 0.00178 4.78319 ***
Cash Flow 0.13494 5.73932 *** 0.17673 8.74116 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05563 4.24743 *** 0.02592 3.29690 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00813 3.41988 *** 0.00557 3.17827 ***
Profit Rate 0.45018 10.08320 *** 0.34251 8.86335 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.05694 3.09395 *** 0.02399 1.94783 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.01181 4.89983 *** 0.00614 3.93777 ***
Cash Flow 0.32879 6.52650 *** 0.28299 6.90147 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.06181 3.24482 *** 0.01444 1.31014
Hausman Test 0.00010
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00798 3.34197 *** 0.00534 3.01260 ***
Profit Rate 0.46603 9.15121 *** 0.33818 7.88039 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04839 2.60845 *** 0.02216 1.77587 *
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.01137 4.76590 *** 0.00605 3.81411 ***
Cash Flow 0.37738 6.86989 *** 0.30458 6.92317 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.04995 2.62884 *** 0.01127 0.99550
Hausman Test 0.00010
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level
㌰Table 4  Estimation of the Investment Function in Japan
- The Case of Tobin’s Q and Other Fundamental Variables being Included Together
(2) The Period of Estimation : 1985-1996
Iron & Steel Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00967 1.94240 * 0.00799 1.85110 *
Profit Rate 0.28687 4.73002 *** 0.25580 4.97362 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01676 0.68704 0.02004 1.36756
Hausman Test 0.54490
Tobin's Q 0.01552 3.26746 *** 0.01380 3.31166 ***
Cash Flow 0.30192 3.11777 *** 0.31313 3.65285 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.01145 0.46413 0.01577 0.92867
Hausman Test 0.87510
Nonferrous Metals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01865 8.66435 *** 0.01270 8.76989 ***
Profit Rate 0.24694 4.79749 *** 0.20313 4.76964 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.00651 -0.44435 0.00575 0.57338
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.02086 10.22340 *** 0.01377 10.44010 ***
Cash Flow 0.30083 3.75184 *** 0.28540 4.67323 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.00457 -0.30989 0.00539 0.55378
Hausman Test 0.00000
Chemicals Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00935 5.99833 *** 0.00946 6.92272 ***
Profit Rate 0.52319 11.16460 *** 0.36061 9.64791 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.03484 -3.77866 *** -0.01437 -2.21561 **
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.01174 7.87713 *** 0.01040 8.13495 ***
Cash Flow 0.71534 11.06320 *** 0.50155 10.57830 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.02855 -3.09983 *** -0.01677 -2.69702 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
㌱Electrical Equipment Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.00405 8.94072 *** 0.00288 7.61549 ***
Profit Rate 0.20662 11.35420 *** 0.20868 13.01600 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05285 -5.83361 *** -0.03779 -5.70835 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.00551 13.30080 *** 0.00398 11.62640 ***
Cash Flow 0.16312 9.45319 *** 0.18928 11.62810 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.05513 -6.01684 *** -0.03801 -5.82528 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(including shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02410 8.52854 *** 0.01954 7.73834 ***
Profit Rate 0.15858 2.77841 *** 0.17407 3.46854 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07543 -5.72740 *** -0.03387 -3.82674 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.02409 9.05577 *** 0.01983 8.80039 ***
Cash Flow 0.30639 6.06653 *** 0.36404 8.32413 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07690 -5.96946 *** -0.02884 -3.57668 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Transportation Equipment
(excluding shipbuilding) Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.02189 6.97209 *** 0.01750 6.31014 ***
Profit Rate 0.28714 3.94302 *** 0.27125 4.39341 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.07961 -5.83458 *** -0.03113 -3.46354 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
Tobin's Q 0.02378 8.27891 *** 0.01980 8.21062 ***
Cash Flow 0.34230 6.38729 *** 0.37822 7.93591 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio -0.08146 -6.09383 *** -0.02888 -3.43701 ***
Hausman Test 0.00000
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level
㌲Table 5  Investment Functions of Keiretsu-Affiliated and Non-Affiliated Groupings 
All Industries (Fixed Effect Model)
(i) Four Major Keiretsu Groupings
Keiretsu-Affiliated Grouping Non-Affiliated Grouping
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
TobinQ 0.01938 13.24950 *** 0.00616 6.84234 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.08543 6.95808 *** 0.05916 4.64137 ***
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01384 8.62628 *** 0.00581 6.47418 ***
Profit Rate 0.15511 7.92228 *** 0.05800 5.75163 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.08359 6.89509 *** 0.05464 4.30466 ***
(ii) Six Major Keiretsu Groupings
Keiretsu-Affiliated Grouping Non-Affiliated Grouping
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
TobinQ 0.01354 12.74650 *** 0.00520 4.76569 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07543 7.09282 *** 0.06449 3.94865 ***
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Tobin's Q 0.01232 11.53070 *** 0.00383 3.51576 ***
Profit Rate 0.64498 7.14286 *** 0.18712 7.20758 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.07298 6.90766 *** 0.05148 3.18312 ***
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Ordinary Least Square Fixed Effect Model  Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 1.30619 12.8558 *** 1.24379 9.57017 *** 1.27023 12.7022 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.21162 1.78683 * 0.37476 1.97776 ** 0.25665 2.05083 **
Hausman Test 0.84443
⡩椩⁅獴業慴楯渠睩瑨⁴桥⁤敢琭慳獥琠牡瑩
Ordinary Least Square Fixed Effect Model  Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 0.86085 6.54807 *** 0.57229 3.49922 *** 0.72247 5.66394 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.45157 3.59841 *** 0.70009 3.66661 *** 0.54237 4.16247 ***
Debt-Asset Ratio -0.33131 -5.23374 *** -0.51315 -6.46500 *** -0.41063 -6.66482 ***
Hausman Test 4.83210
*** significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level , and * significant at a 10% level呡扬攠㠮⁉湶敳瑭敮琠䙵湣瑩潮猠楮⁔慩睡
⡉⤠䕳瑩浡瑩潮⁢礠畳楮朠杲潳猠楮捯浥
Ordinary Least Square Fixed Effect Model  Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Profit Rate 0.38513 4.18879 *** 0.24347 0.93054 0.38035 4.05021 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.08966 2.21650 ** -0.02500 -0.28702 0.08725 2.10719 **
Hausman Test 2.1709
⡩楩⤠䕳瑩浡瑩潮⁢礠畳楮朠摩晦敲敮捥搠獡汥
Ordinary Least Square Fixed Effect Model  Random Effect Model 
Explanatory variables Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Differenced Sales 0.46819 10.89540 *** 0.46669 8.14094 *** 0.46719 10.84330 ***
Long-term Loan Ratio 0.11087 2.93963 *** 0.05401 0.66815 0.11043 2.89459 ***
Hausman Test 0.64525
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